Research

I identify a previously unexplored empirical regularity concerning territorial acquisition: some states obtain territory via fait accompli while others first pursue a militarized pressure campaign and then proceed to acquire territory. If surprise is a key advantage of fait accomplis, why do states forego that advantage and under what conditions? I model this strategic decision that states make, and show that militarized pressure campaigns influence the war constraint of territorial acquisition rendering them a more appropriate strategy for states with constrained aims. The model sheds light on Russia's war against Ukraine and Turkey's invasion and continued occupation in Cyprus. The model's empirical classification implications identify pressuring as the predominant strategy for territorial acquisition during the 1918-2016 period.

Why do victims of coercion reject demands for territorial adjustments? I develop a sequential game in which a revisionist state can first demand concessions from a victim state and then pursue unilateral territorial acquisition. I analyze the states' bargaining and post-bargaining behavior as a function of the revisionist's capacity to finance a costly unilateral land grab. Bargaining agreements work as a costless transfer of territory and revisionism by bargaining is constrained by the revisionist's capacity to finance unilateral aggression. In equilibrium, a revisionist state almost always engages in post-bargaining opportunism and thus, victims, rationally reject negotiated bargains to bound the magnitude of aggregate revisionism.

Salami tactics is a strategy of incremental transgressions. According to the discipline's consensus ever since Schelling, this strategy cumulatively achieves significant strategic gains while avoiding outright confrontation. I provide the first experimental test of the effectiveness of salami tactics in the context of territorial revisionism. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I find that salami tactics actually backfire and trigger a stronger response for confronting revisionism. The results hold both for deterrence and extended-deterrence scenarios.

Does science ever reach unbiased conclusions? I model science as a strategic production game of knowledge in which biased researchers seek to move the scientific consensus away from the truth while independent researchers seek to correct distortions. The model illustrates how the scientific consensus is shaped by who prevails in the competitive process of publishing. In equilibrium, research fields fall into three categories: truth-preserving fields, where independent research deters the biased researchers from entering; mixed fields, where independent research partially corrects distortions; and fully biased fields, where biased research deters the independent researchers from entering.